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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether audit report lag (ARL) is determined by certain auditor-related 
factors. Understanding the determinants of ARL is important as ARL is the single most important 
factor in determining the timing of earnings releases and, therefore, improving the timeliness of 
companies’ announcements of earnings. Unlike prior studies, we are particularly interested in 
examining various auditor-related factors including audit and non-audit fees received from clients, 
auditor tenure, type of auditor and audit opinion. Using a recent Korean sample, we find that ARL 
is negatively associated with non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditors, consistent with 
“knowledge spillover” from the provision of non-audit services. We also find that ARL is 
negatively associated with the use of Big 4 auditors and unqualified audit opinions. We are, 
however, not able to find significant associations between ARL and auditor tenure, or abnormal 
audit fees paid to incumbent auditors. Additional analyses provide evidence that abnormal audit 
hours and the provision of tax services, and services relating to the design of internal control 
systems, significantly reduce ARL. 
 
Keywords:  audit report lag, abnormal audit fees, non-audit services, auditor tenure, audit opinion, Korea 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
he main purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of auditor-related factors on audit report lag. 
Audit report lag (ARL) is the time period between a company‟s fiscal year-end and the audit report 
date. Examining factors that affect ARL is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it increases our 
understanding of the audit process; Bamber et al. (1993), for example, argue that ARL is one of the few variables 
associated with audit efficiency that is externally observable. Secondly, ARL is directly associated with the 
timeliness of announcements of company earnings (Givoly and Palmon 1982). The value of information from 
audited financial statements also generally declines as ARL increases because users will obtain financial information 
from other potentially more costly sources (Knechel and Payne 2001). To increase the efficiency of markets, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, has issued rules requiring phased reductions in filing 
deadlines from 90 days after the financial year-end to 60 days, by 2007 (SEC 2005). 
 
Several studies have examined the determinants of ARL. The results of these prior studies indicate that 
ARL is affected by client size, the complexity of an audit, and the type of earnings information (Bamber at al. 1993; 
Ng and Tai 1994). There is, however, very limited evidence on the relationship between auditor-related 
characteristics and ARL. For example, Knechel and Payne (2001) find that the provision of certain non-audit 
services increases ARL for a small sample of mostly private firms. Using 171 Greek companies in 2000, Leventis et 
al. (2005) find a negative association between ARL and auditor type, particularly auditors with international 
affiliation. No prior study comprehensively examines the association of various characteristics of auditor-related 
factors with ARL.  
 
T 
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Unlike prior studies, which have used survey data and small samples, we examine the determinants of ARL 
using a large sample, consisting of 8,833 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2005 in Korea. We find a significantly 
negative association between non-audit and tax services and ARL. With regard to the relationship between ARL and 
the provision of tax services, our result contradicts that of Knechel and Payne (2001). One possible reason for this 
contrary finding is that we are able to use the large fees disclosures in recent annual reports of public firms, while 
Knechel and Payne (2001) use non-audit services provided in 1991 for 226 mostly private firms. We also find that 
the provision of services relating to the design of internal control systems significantly reduces ARL, which is 
consistent with “knowledge spillovers.” We find that Big 4 auditors spend much less time in completing an audit, 
which is consistent with greater efficiency, possibly due to the better technology available to Big 4 auditors. 
Auditors spend much less time on an audit when they issue an unqualified audit opinion as opposed to when they 
issue other than an unqualified opinion. However, we are unable to find evidence that auditor tenure or abnormal 
audit fees influence ARL. Regarding control variables, our analyses confirm findings of prior studies showing that 
client complexity, firm size, a Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) as opposed to a Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotation (KOSDAQ) listing, ownership concentration, and profitability significantly influence ARL. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the relevant literature and develops 
our research questions. This is followed by a discussion of our research design. Empirical results are presented next, 
followed by our conclusions. 
   
2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
2.1  Audit Report Lag 
 
The length of an audit is cited as the single most important factor affecting the timeliness of an earnings 
announcement (Givoly and Palmon 1982). Studies show that the timeliness of an earnings announcement is directly 
related to stock price; firms that announce earnings early (late) are, on average, viewed positively (negatively) by a 
stock market (Chambers and Penman 1984; Kross and Schroeder 1984). 
 
According to the U.S. SEC, a delay before earnings information is released makes the information less 
valuable to investors (SEC 2002). The Korean Securities and Exchange Act (KSEA 1997, Article 194-3) stipulates 
the matters necessary for annual reports and for disclosures by listed corporations. The Act requires that audited 
financial statements be included in companies‟ annual reports, together with other important matters prescribed by 
the Presidential Decree to the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), which is the Korean equivalent to 
the U.S. SEC. Recognizing the importance of the timely release of earnings information, the KSEA (1997, Article 
186-2) requires that annual reports be filed with the FSC within 90 days of fiscal year-end. In addition, the Korean 
Commercial Act (1995, Article 363) requires that firms make the audited financial statements available to 
shareholders two weeks prior to the shareholders‟ meeting. 
 
2.2  Relationship Between Abnormal Audit Fees And Audit Report Lag 
 
By employing more experienced and/or specialist audit partners and skilled staff, auditors are able to 
reduce audit report lag. Using highly-skilled audit team members, however, increases the cost of an audit to above-
normal levels. Thus, ceteris paribus, audit report lag shortens as abnormal audit fees increase. On the other hand, 
Knechel and Payne (2001) state that an incremental audit effort increases the time needed to complete field work. 
They argue that, once a required level of audit effort has been achieved, additional audit effort increases audit report 
lag without increasing overall audit quality. The effect of audit fees being different from those expected (i.e., 
abnormal audit fees) on ARL is therefore an empirical question. Abnormal audit fees (ABAUF) are computed as the 
residuals from the following model (see Gist 1994; Craswell and Francis 1999; Menon and Williams 2001; Beattie 
et al. 2001; among others for this audit fee model).  
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LNAUF it = 0 + β1 LNOHNAF it +β2 LNTAX it +β3 FORSALE it +β4 TENURE it +β5 BIG4 it +β6 AUOP it + β7 
DGC it + β8 LNSIZE it + β9 ROA it + β10 LEVERAGE it + β11 LOSS it  
+ β12 YEND it + β13 SQSUB it + β14 KSE it + β15 INVREC it + litkk YEARDUM  
+ litjj INDDUM + lill FIRMDUM +  it  --- (1) 
 
where 
 
LNAUF: natural log of audit service fees paid to incumbent auditors;  
LNOHNAF: natural log of non-audit service fees other than tax services paid to incumbent auditors; 
LNTAX: natural log of tax service fees paid to incumbent auditors; 
FORSALE: percentage of sales abroad over total sales; 
TENURE: auditor tenure, measured as the number of continuous years of auditor engagement; 
BIG4: 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
AUOP: 1 if the auditor‟s opinion is unqualified, 0 otherwise; 
DGC: indicator variable where 1 indicates a going concern modification, 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE: client firm size, measured as the natural log of total assets; 
ROA: net income divided by total assets; 
LEVERAGE: total debt divided by total assets; 
LOSS: 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
YEND: 1 if a firm has a December fiscal year-end, 0 otherwise; 
SQSUB: square root of the number of subsidiaries of a client; 
KSE: 1 if a firm is listed on Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), 0 if listed on KOSDAQ; 
INVREC: proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets; 
YEARDUM: year indicators;  
INDDUM: industry indicators; and 
FIRMDUM: firm indicators. 
 
LNOHNAF is included since firms paying higher audit fees tend to purchase more non-audit services 
(Whisenant et al. 2003). Firms purchasing tax services from their incumbent auditors tend to be more complex 
(Knechel and Payne 2001) possibly because of international operations. Since tax services for international 
operations are not separately disclosed, we include both LNTAX and FORSALE to indirectly control for the 
complexity. BIG4 auditors and auditors with longer TENURE provide higher quality assurance services (Francis et 
al. 1999; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003). Thus, they may be able to charge higher fees for their quality 
services. AUOP and DGC are included since auditors issuing other than unqualified audit opinions require 
additional audit work (Abbott et al. 2006). Client size (LNSIZE) is included since firm size is the most important 
explanatory variable in determining audit fees (Bell et al. 2001). More complex and risky firms are more likely pay 
higher audit fees (Craswell and Francis 1999). Thus, we include SQSUB, INVREC, ROA, LEVERAGE, and LOSS as 
proxies for client complexity and/or engagement risk. YEND is included is since busier season may require 
additional audit expenses to pay overtime premium. KSE listed firms are subject to stricter rules and regulations and 
have more interested parties than KOSDAQ listed firms. Thus, KSE listed firms are more likely to pay higher audit 
fees. Year and industry indicators (i.e., YEARDUM and INDDUM) are included in order to control for year and 
industry fixed effects. Finally, in order to control for all company-specific characteristics that are not captured by the 
other variables, we include dummy variables for firms (FIRMDUM) in the sample. The results of the model (1) are 
generally consistent with our expectations and prior studies. The model is highly significant at the one percent level 
(the results are available upon request). 
 
2.3  Relationship Between Non-Audit Fees And Audit Report Lag 
 
Prior studies have suggested that the provision of non-audit services to audit clients results in “knowledge 
spillover” (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986; O‟Keefe et al. 1994). These studies argue that the provision of non-audit 
services reduces start-up time and/or makes staff members more efficient. Knechel and Payne (2001) also argue that 
the provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors reduces audit effort, reducing audit report lag, and find 
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evidence consistent with their expectation. Their results, however, cannot be applied more generally to the 
population of publicly-traded firms because 80 percent of the 226 sample firms are private firms from a proprietary 
database. While Knechel and Payne (2001) use a dummy variable to identify non-audit services, we measure non-
audit services (LNNAF) as the natural log of non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditors. We expect a negative 
association between audit report lag (ARL) and non-audit fees. 
 
2.4  Relationship Between Auditor Tenure And Audit Report Lag 
 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO 2003) reports that it takes auditors at least two to three years to 
become adequately acquainted with a client‟s operations. Johnson et al. (2002) provide evidence that short-tenured 
auditors (tenure of two to three years) are associated with lower-quality audits when compared with medium-tenured 
auditors (tenure of four to eight years). Carcello and Nagy (2004) find a higher incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting in the early years of an auditor-client relationship. These findings support the notion that auditors gain a 
fuller and more complete understanding of client operations as their tenure increases. 
 
Ashton et al. (1987) suggest that there should be an increase in reporting lag with a new audit client 
because of the start-up time required for an auditor to become familiar with the client‟s records, operations, internal 
controls and the prior period working papers. They do not report evidence of an association between ARL and 
tenure from their sample of 488 firms from survey data obtained from a single audit firm in 1982.  
 
The above studies suggest that newer auditors will need to spend more time learning about their client‟s 
operations, and their risk and accounting systems, in the initial years of the engagement. As auditor tenure increases, 
therefore, audit efficiency is expected to increase, leading to shorter ARLs. While Ashton et al. (1987) use a six 
point scale to measure tenure (tenure greater than five years is assigned a value of six), we measure tenure 
(TENURE) using a continuous variable. 
 
2.5  Relationship Between Big 4 Auditors And Audit Report Lag 
 
Auditor type can also influence ARL. Big 4 accounting firms have better access to advanced technologies 
and specialist staff when compared to non-Big 4 firms. Differences in well-programmed audit procedures and 
technologies can lead to differences in audit report lags between the two groups of auditors (Schwartz and Soo 
1996). This study includes a dichotomous variable to classify auditors into Big 4 and non-Big 4 categories. We 
expect a negative association between ARL and audit by Big 4 auditors (BIG4). 
 
2.6  Relationship Between Type Of Audit Opinion And Audit Report Lag 
 
Korean Auditing Standards (KICPA 2005) require auditors to issue either qualified or adverse reports for 
departures from generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP), and a  qualified opinion or disclaimer for a 
limitation of scope. Whittred (1980) reports that auditors of clients receiving an unqualified audit opinion generally 
complete their audits earlier, shortening ARL. Soltani (2002) finds similar evidence in a sample of publicly traded 
French companies. Schwartz and Soo (1996) also report a longer ARL when an auditor‟s opinion needs modification. 
Based on the above studies, we suggest that auditors perform their audits less efficiently when departures from 
GAAP or a scope limitation are involved. Auditor opinion (AUOP) is measured as an indicator variable with a value 
of 1 if the audit opinion is unqualified and 0 otherwise (Whittred 1980; Butler et al. 2004). Consistent with prior 
studies, we expect a negative association between AUOP and ARL. 
 
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1  Sample 
 
Our initial sample includes 8,950 firm-years, representing 1,560 firms, from 1999 to 2005 for which audit 
report dates and audit fees are available in audit and annual reports. All data used in this study are publicly available 
via the Dart System of Korean Financial Supervisory Services (KFSS). KFSS has, since fiscal 2001, required 
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publicly traded firms to disclose in their annual reports the audit and non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditors for 
the current and past 2 years. We then delete 19 firm-years with an audit report lag longer than the 90 days consistent 
with the requirement of the KSEA (1997, Article 186-2) and the Act on External Audit of Corporations (AEAC, 
1998, Article 3-2). Results are qualitatively the same when we use several different criteria for deleting extreme 
ARLs (not reported). Finally, we eliminate firm-years for which the financial data necessary for use in our 
regressions are not available in the Korea Information Service (KIS) financial database. This reduces the sample size 
to 8,833 firm-years (655 in 1999; 1,086 in 2000; 1,276 in 2001; 1,388 in 2002; 1,459 in 2003; 1,501 in 2004; 1,468 
in 2005), representing 1,537 firms. 
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
Bearing in mind prior studies (Bamber et al. 1993; Henderson and Kaplan 2000; Knechel and Payne 2001), 
we estimate the following audit report lag model to examine the research questions. Unlike prior studies, we use 
Poisson regressions that are used for a non-negative integer dependent variable and are censored at 0. Using OLS, 
however, does not change our conclusions. 
 
ARL it = 0 + β1 ABAUF it + β2 LNNAF it + β3 TENURE it + β4 BIG4 it + β5 AUOP it  
+ β6 LNSIZE it + β7 ROA it + β8 LEVERAGE it + β9 LOSS it + β10 YEND it + β11 SQSUB it  
+ β12 KSE it + β13 INVREC it + β14 EXTRA it + β15 OWNCON it  
+ litkk YEARDUM + litjj INDDUM +  it  --- (2) 
 
where 
 
ARL: number of calendar days from fiscal year-end to date of the auditor‟s report; 
ABAUF: abnormal audit fees, residuals from audit fee model (1); 
LNNAF: natural log of non-audit service fees paid to incumbent auditors; 
TENURE: auditor tenure, measured as the number of continuous years of auditor engagement; 
BIG4: 1 if an auditor is one of the Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
AUOP: 1 if the auditor‟s opinion is unqualified, 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE: client firm size, measured as the natural log of total assets; 
ROA: net income divided by total assets; 
LEVERAGE: total debt divided by total assets; 
LOSS: 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
YEND:  1 if a firm has a December fiscal year-end, 0 otherwise; 
SQSUB: square root of the number of subsidiaries of a client; 
KSE: 1 if a firm is listed on Korean Stock Exchange, 0 if listed on KOSDAQ; 
INVREC: proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets; 
EXTRA: 1 if a firm reports extraordinary items, 0 otherwise;  
OWNCON: ownership concentration, measured by shares outstanding divided by the number of shareholders scaled 
by 1,000; 
YEARDUM: year indicators; and 
INDDUM: industry indicators. 
 
3.3  Variables Used 
 
There has been virtually no research using public data examining the effects of a comprehensive set of 
auditor-related factors on ARL. As discussed in the previous section, auditor-related factors examined in this study 
include abnormal audit service fees and fees paid to incumbent auditors for non-audit services, auditor tenure, 
auditor type, and audit opinion. 
 
We use a number of control variables to explain variations in ARL. The auditor‟s business risk, which is 
the risk of litigation due to an auditor‟s failure to detect a material misstatement in the financial statements, is 
positively related to the extent of audit work performed by an auditor (Bamber et al. 1993). Therefore, the higher an 
auditor‟s business risk, the longer the expected ARL. Consistent with Bamber et al. (1993), an auditor‟s business 
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risk is proxied by the client‟s ownership concentration (OWNCON), measured as the proportion of shares 
outstanding to the number of shareholders divided by 1,000, and the client‟s leverage ratio (LEVERAGE). Bamber et 
al. (1993) argue that as the number of individual investors relying on a client‟s financial statements increases, the 
auditor‟s (and the client‟s) exposure to litigation also increases. On the other hand, firms with concentrated 
ownership experience greater information asymmetry in the capital markets. Many Korean firms are managed by 
owners who hold a significant portion of the firm‟s equity shares. Controlling shareholders have greater incentive 
and means to expropriate firm resources than others (Denis and McConnell 2003). The ownership structure of 
Korean firms is complex due to pyramidal and/or cross-ownership across affiliated firms and family members (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). Thus, concentrated ownership may, in fact, increase audit risk. The 
association between ARL and ownership diversification is therefore an empirical question. Brumfield et al. (1983) 
suggest that when a client‟s financial position is weak, the auditor‟s business risk increases. Thus, ARL is expected 
to be longer for high leverage firms. 
 
The more diverse and complex are the client‟s operations, the greater is the likelihood of material errors 
occurring and the greater is the amount of audit work that must be performed (Bamber et al. 1993). Audit 
complexity is proxied by the number of subsidiaries (SQSUB), measured as the square root of the number of 
subsidiaries of a firm, and the proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets (INVREC). As the number of 
subsidiaries and the amount of inventory and receivables increases, ARL is likely to increase.  
 
We control for other work-related factors that affect the extent of audit work. Specifically we control for 
extraordinary items (EXTRA), using an indicator with value 1 if a firm reports extraordinary items, and 0 otherwise 
(Newton and Ashton 1989; Bamber et al. 1993); losses (LOSS) are measured using an indicator with value 1 if a 
firm reports negative earnings, and 0 otherwise (Ashton et al. 1987); profitability (ROA) is measured as net income 
divided by total assets (Jaggi and Tsui 1999); and busy seasons (YEND)  are measured with an indicator with value 1 
if a client-firm has fiscal year-end in December, and 0 otherwise (Davies and Whittred 1980: Garsombke 1981; 
Knechel and Payne 2001). ARL is expected to be longer when there are extraordinary items and negative earnings 
(Ashton et al. 1987). Busy seasons (YEND) can possibly increase ARL if there is a shortage of audit staff during 
these periods (Ashton et al. 1989; Newton and Ashton 1989; Knechel and Payne 2001). Firms listed on the Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE) tend to be well-established firms due to stricter requirements for registration relative to those 
on KOSDAQ, and ARL is therefore likely to be shorter. 
 
ARL is also a function of the extent to which clients have incentives to report financial information in a 
timely manner (Bamber et al. 1993). Large audit clients face greater external pressure to report financial information 
early (Newton and Ashton 1989), suggesting that large firms will have a shorter ARL. Client size (LNSIZE) is 
measured using the natural log of total assets. Finally, ARL is expected to vary across industries (INDDUM) and 
years (YEARDUM). 
 
4.0  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1, Panel A, shows the distribution of the sample by industry. Similarly to Frankel et al. (2002) and 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003), we classify the firms into 25 industry groups. The firms represent a wide range of industries, 
with about 24.3 percent coming from the Machinery manufacturing and Service industries. ARLs are longer in the 
Computer and the Farming/Fishing /Coal Mining industries and shorter in the Utilities and the Glass/Ceramics 
industries. The Ship and Automobile/Transportation Equipment manufacturing industries pay higher audit fees, as 
firms in these industries are relatively large in size. The Utilities industry pays the highest non-audit fees. The 
Machinery industry pays more non-audit than audit fees to their auditors, which may reflect greater demand for 
consulting services due to the highly competitive business environment and/or the need for automation and re-
engineering (KAMI 2005). 
 
Table 1, Panel B, shows the sample distribution by year. There are fewer observations in 1999; mainly 
because the filing of audit reports with the Dart System was not required in 1999. ARL has generally been declining 
while audit fees have been increasing over time. The decline in ARL is possibly due to management recognition of 
the increasing importance of timely reporting. Audit fees peaked in 2005 while non-audit fees were highest in 2003.  
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Table 1 
Sample Description 
 
Panel A. Industry Distribution 
Industry
N Percent ARL Audit Fees
Non-Audit
Fees ABAUF Tenure Big 4
Unqualified
Opinion
Farm/Fish/Coal 45        0.5 50.73 50,984       578              -0.0092 4.64 0.4000 1.0000
Food 397      4.5 44.17 67,941       20,798         0.0039 5.14 0.6751 0.9824
Textile 417      4.7 49.10 42,383       2,834           -0.0017 5.32 0.3933 0.9712
Publishing 322      3.6 46.35 48,120       4,214           0.0027 3.64 0.5652 0.9658
Chemicals 595      6.7 42.29 70,277       30,565         -0.0017 5.29 0.5882 0.9882
Phamaceuticals 405      4.6 43.64 41,827       3,793           -0.0015 6.06 0.5358 0.9901
Rubber/Plastic 185      2.1 47.30 41,512       8,027           0.0071 4.11 0.4216 0.9730
Glass/Ceramic 83        0.9 36.57 144,347     6,024           -0.0090 5.94 0.6506 0.9880
Construction Materials 146      1.7 45.97 74,253       10,258         -0.0031 4.40 0.5411 0.9932
Steel 349      4.0 41.74 63,482       25,443         0.0057 4.16 0.6934 0.9713
Non-ferrous Metal 375      4.2 47.55 45,170       12,202         0.0020 4.73 0.4720 0.9813
Computer 113      1.3 50.29 52,649       23,852         0.0259 3.65 0.5575 0.9823
Machinery 969      11.0 47.47 38,542       49,661         0.0028 4.05 0.5315 0.9701
Electricity Equipment 106      1.2 41.33 53,507       8,972           -0.0044 5.04 0.5943 0.9434
Semi-conductor/Electronics 653      7.4 45.77 57,521       15,616         0.0069 4.28 0.5100 0.9786
Communication Equipment 712      8.1 47.90 53,264       40,879         0.0019 4.14 0.4916 0.9691
Automobile Parts 351      4.0 48.07 43,837       5,746           -0.0014 4.64 0.6040 0.9943
Ship Manufacturing 50        0.6 42.86 201,834     49,235         0.0114 6.24 0.8600 1.0000
Automobile/Transportation Equipment Manufacturing51        0.6 43.59 204,755     43,089         0.0160 6.20 0.7451 0.9216
Funiture 91        1.0 49.97 49,452       5,287           -0.0036 6.12 0.6044 1.0000
Utilities 152      1.7 36.07 155,613     60,722         0.0119 4.59 0.8421 1.0000
Construction 367      4.2 48.24 86,981       16,733         0.0012 4.23 0.7302 0.9728
Retail 584      6.6 47.16 64,194       29,364         0.0055 4.61 0.6301 0.9521
Service 1,172   13.3 44.74 40,748       10,666         0.0047 3.76 0.6288 0.9872
Transportation 143      1.6 40.55 95,527       15,613         0.0030 6.18 0.6923 0.9790
Total 8,833   100.0 45.71 57,754       21,846         0.0027 4.53 0.5779 0.9774
Mean ValueFirm-Years
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Year Distribution 
Year
N Percent ARL Audit Fees
Non-Audit
Fees ABAUF Tenure Big 4
Unqualified
Opinion
1999 655      7.4 46.36 44,176       10,821         -0.0054 3.86 0.6275 0.9573
2000 1,086   12.3 47.61 43,626       23,527         0.0161 3.88 0.5737 0.9530
2001 1,276   14.4 46.58 47,721       22,997         0.0078 4.13 0.5854 0.9859
2002 1,388   15.7 45.90 59,706       22,410         0.0019 4.41 0.5829 0.9841
2003 1,459   16.5 46.19 59,808       30,148         0.0011 5.06 0.5833 0.9808
2004 1,501   17.0 44.21 65,654       18,541         -0.0006 5.23 0.5869 0.9807
2005 1,468   16.6 44.15 71,022       19,114         -0.0022 4.54 0.5334 0.9837
Total 8,833   100.0 45.71 57,754       21,846         0.0027 4.53 0.5779 0.9774
Mean ValueFirm-Years
 
 
Panel C. Auditor Distribution 
Year
N Percent ARL Audit Fees
Non-Audit
Fees ABAUF Tenure Big 4
Unqualified
Opinion
EY 1,620   18.3 45.83 51,659       6,072           -0.0026 4.86 1.0000 0.9759
KPMG 690      7.8 42.63 95,499       14,922         -0.0017 3.22 1.0000 0.9623
DT 987      11.2 42.80 68,037       16,465         -0.0050 3.95 1.0000 0.9858
PWC 1,808   20.5 42.31 84,526       57,645         0.0159 5.46 1.0000 0.9829
Non-Big 4 3,728   42.2 48.63 37,677       14,032         0.0014 4.33 0.0000 0.9759
Total 8,833   100.0 45.71 57,754       21,846         0.0027 4.53 0.5779 0.9774
Mean ValueFirm-Years
 
 
Notes: ARL: mean value of audit report lag; Audit /Non-Audit Fees: mean values of audit/non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditors in thousands of Korean Won; ABAUF: 
abnormal audit fees, residuals from audit fee model; Tenure: mean value of auditor tenure; Big 4: proportion of Big 4 auditors; Unqualified Opinion: proportion of unqualified 
opinions. 
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The higher audit fees in 2004 and 2005 reflect additional fees paid to incumbent auditors for the newly-
required evaluation by auditors of the effectiveness of internal accounting management systems, equivalent to the 
evaluation of internal control effectiveness over financial reporting in the United States. We therefore use the term 
„internal control effectiveness‟ hereafter when discussing the effectiveness of internal accounting management 
systems. The AEAC (2003, article 2-3) has required auditors to evaluate and report on the effectiveness of client 
firms‟ internal accounting management systems for firms with fiscal year-end after April 1st, 2004. The mean value 
of audit fees paid to auditors is 57,754,000 Korean Won (U$57,013 based on an exchange rate at the end of 2005 of 
1,013 Korean Won to 1 U.S. Dollar). The mean value of non-audit fees paid to incumbent auditors is 21,845,660 
Korean Won. Only 2,103 firm-years, from 701 firms, report non-zero non-audit service fees (the mean value of this 
sample is 91,753,910 Korean Won). 
 
Table 1, Panel C, shows the mean values of key variables by auditors. About 57.8% of sample firm-years 
are audited by one of Big 4 auditors. Among Big 4 audit firms, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) accounts for the 
largest proportion of the sample (around 20.5 percent) and has a shorter ARL, on average, than other audit firms. 
PwC also receives, on average, the highest audit and non-audit fees and has the longest auditor tenure. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
N = 8,833 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
ARL 45.7106 13.9379 0.0000 35.0000 46.0000 55.0000 90.0000
ABAUF 0.0027 0.1913 -0.8206 -0.0998 0.0050 0.1120 0.7245
LNNAF 2.2587 4.1056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 12.7099
TENURE 4.5321 3.8398 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 6.0000 23.0000
BIG4 0.5779 0.4939 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
AUOP 0.9774 0.1488 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
LNSIZE 18.1915 1.4545 15.4977 17.1551 17.9090 18.9775 22.8274
ROA 0.0152 0.1628 -0.7883 0.0037 0.0378 0.0851 0.4191
LEVERAGE 1.2083 1.8147 -3.4597 0.4034 0.8139 1.4573 13.3264
LOSS 0.2317 0.4220 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
YEND 0.9378 0.2414 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
SQSUB 0.7018 1.2337 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4142 5.1962
KSE 0.4134 0.4925 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
INVREC 0.3023 0.1594 0.0141 0.1826 0.2892 0.4064 0.7056
EXTRA 0.1303 0.3367 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
OWNCON 3.9411 4.3341 0.2757 1.1167 2.4500 5.2284 24.4898  
____________________________________ 
Variable Definitions 
ARL: number of calendar days from fiscal year-end to date of the auditor‟s report; 
ABAUF: abnormal audit fee, residuals from the audit fee model (1); 
LNNAF: natural log of non-audit service fees paid to incumbent auditors; 
TENURE: auditor tenure measured as the number of continuous years of auditor engagement; 
BIG4: 1 if an auditor is one of Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
AUOP: 1 if the auditor‟s opinion is unqualified, 0 otherwise; 
LNSIZE: client firm size, measured as the natural log of total assets; 
ROA: net income divided by total assets; 
LEVERAGE: total debt divided by total assets; 
LOSS: 1 if a firm reports negative earnings, 0 otherwise; 
YEND:  1 if a firm has a December fiscal year-end, 0 otherwise; 
SQSUB: square root of the number of subsidiaries of a client; 
KSE: 1 if a firm is listed on Korean Stock Exchange, 0 if listed on KOSDAQ; 
INVREC: proportion of inventory and receivables to total assets; 
EXTRA: 1 if a firm reports extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; and 
OWNCON: ownership concentration measured by shares outstanding divided by the number of shareholders scaled by 1,000; 
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Following Bamber et al. (1993), all 
continuous explanatory variables except TENURE were winsorized at both 1 percent and 99 percent levels to reduce 
the effects of extreme values. TENURE is truncated because 1980 is the first year in which KIS reported auditor 
identity. The mean (median) value of ARL is 45.71 (46), which indicates that it took, on average, one-and-a-half 
months after fiscal year-end to complete an audit. The mean (median) value of TENURE is 4.53 (3), indicating that 
the client-auditor relationship lasts, on average, for about four-and–a-half years. Table 2 also shows that 2.3 percent 
of the sample has audit opinions that are other than unqualified (AOPIN), and that the Big 4 audit firms audit 57.8 
percent of the sample firm-years. 
 
About 41 percent of the sample firms are listed on KSE, with the rest listed on KOSDAQ. Thirteen percent 
of the sample firms report extraordinary items (EXTRA), 23.17 percent suffer a net loss (LOSS), and 93.78 percent of 
the sample firms have fiscal year-end in December (YEND). The mean value of total assets is 79,517 million Korean 
Won. 
 
 The Pearson correlation matrix shows that the variables are not highly correlated, with the exception of 
LNSIZE and SQSUB (=0.63); LNSIZE and KSE (=0.60); ROA and LOSS (=-0.68); KSE and SQSUB (=0.43). 
Dropping one or all of KSE, LOSS, and SQSUB, however, does not change our conclusions and provides 
substantially similar results (not reported). 
 
4.2  Regression Results 
 
In Table 3, we document the results of estimating our regression models. Since the dependent variable is 
non-negative integers and they are censored at zero, we use Poisson regression. The empirical results show that the 
coefficient for abnormal audit fees (ABAUF) is insignificant, suggesting that higher-than-expected audit fees do not 
necessarily shorten ARL. This may be because abnormal audit fees are determined by the relative negotiating power 
of client and auditor, rather than by incremental efforts by auditors to complete their audit earlier. The coefficient for 
non-audit services (LNNAF) is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This finding is 
consistent with the presence of “knowledge spillovers” from non-audit services; in other words, auditors who have 
improved their understanding of their client‟s business through non-audit services are able to shorten ARL. 
TENURE is insignificant, suggesting that longer auditor tenure does not necessarily increase audit efficiency in 
Korea. 
 
Consistent with Leventis et al. (2005), Big 4 audit firms complete their audit earlier than non-Big 4 auditors. 
This finding confirms that Big 4 auditors are more efficient in performing their services, possibly due to the 
availability of more advanced technology and specialist staff. AUOP is negative and significant at the one percent 
level, suggesting that auditors spend more time on audits when they issue opinions other than unqualified. This is 
consistent with Ashton et al. (1989), suggesting that auditors are careful issuing other than an unqualified opinion, 
which may cause a client to change its auditor. 
 
We also ran OLS diagnostic tests for the presence of multicollinearity in the models. The highest variance 
inflation factor (VIF) in the model without industry indicators is 3.07 (Model A in Table 3), which suggests that 
multicollinearity is not a serious concern. When we include 24 industry indicator variables, the highest VIF 
increases to 20.30 (the service industry indicator) (Model B in Table 3). However, the coefficients and significances 
of other variables, including all of the auditor-related variables of interest with industry indicators (Model B), are 
qualitatively the same as those without industry indicators (Model A). The Chi-Square of the Poisson regression 
model is greater without the industry indicators, while the Psuedo-R
2
 of the model is greater with the industry 
indicators. 
 
The signs of the regression coefficients for the control variables are generally consistent with findings in 
prior studies. LNSIZE and KSE are negative and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that auditors for 
large and KSE-listed firms complete their audits earlier. ARL is negatively associated with ROA while it is 
positively associated with LOSS, suggesting that profitable and less-risky firms take less time to audit. Consistent 
with this, LEVERAGE is positive and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that auditors for highly-levered, 
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and so riskier, firms take more time to complete their audits. SQSUB and INVREC, proxies for client complexity, 
consistently show a positive association with ARL, indicating that auditors for complex firms take longer to 
complete audits. EXTRA is also positive and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that auditors for firms 
reporting extraordinary items take longer to complete their audits. As ownership concentration increases, auditors 
spend more time completing their audit, suggesting that auditors are more careful in performing their work for 
clients with a high ownership concentration, possibly because of owner influence over accounting practices and the 
over-riding of internal control systems by a few influential owner-managers. Finally, the year indicator variables 
show a decreasing pattern over time, indicating that auditors have shortened their audit process over the sample 
period. 
 
 
Table 3 
Poisson Regression Results 
 
ARL it = 0 + β1 ABAUF it + β2 LNNAF it + 3 TENURE it + β4 BIG4 it + β5 AUOP it  
+ β6 LNSIZE it + β7 ROA it + β8 LEVERAGE it + β9 LOSS it + β10 YEND it + β11 SQSUB it  
+ β12 KSE it + β13 INVREC it + β14 EXTRA it + β15 OWNCON it  
+ litkk YEARDUM + litjj INDDUM +  it   
(A) (B)
Expected
Sign
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Variables (t-value) (t-value)
Intercept +/- 4.4141 4.5523
    (134.49)***     (111.65)***
ABAUF +/- 0.0105 0.0115
         (1.27)          (1.40)
LNNAF - -0.0035 -0.0032
    (-8.32)***     (-7.55)***
TENURE - 0.0004 0.0005
         (0.98)          (1.14)
BIG4 - -0.0842 -0.0784
    (-25.26)***     (-23.27)***
AUOP - -0.1199 -0.1165
    (-12.12)***     (-11.73)***
LNSIZE - -0.0245 -0.0246
    (-13.79)***     (-12.97)***
ROA - -0.2280 -0.0237
    (-17.70)***     (-18.21)***
LEVERAGE + 0.0104 0.0086
    (12.43)***     (10.03)***
LOSS + 0.0553 0.0586
    (10.95)***     (11.51)***
YEND +/- -0.0042 -0.0021
         (-0.64)          (-0.31)
SQSUB + 0.0289 0.0313
    (16.64)***     (17.08)***
KSE - -0.0634 -0.0738
    (-15.20)***     (-16.74)***
INVREC + 0.1185 0.1059
    (11.39)***     (9.64)***  
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
EXTRA + 0.0290 0.0231
    (5.98)***       (4.72)***
OWNCON +/- 0.0037 0.0029
    (9.49)***     (7.43)***
Y2000 +/- 0.0118 0.0110
         (1.62)          (1.51)
Y2001 +/- -0.0180 -0.0189
      (-2.50)**       (-2.62)**
Y2002 +/- -0.0415 -0.0415
      (-5.77)***       (-5.77)***
Y2003 +/- -0.0465 -0.0457
    (-6.43)***     (-6.31)***
Y2004 +/- -0.0927 -0.0914
    (-12.61)***     (-12.42)***
Y2005 +/- -0.1003 -0.0996
    (-13.58)***     (-13.47)***
Chi-Square 32,445.45*** 31,573.95***
Psuedo-R
2
0.1345 0.1578
N 8,833 8,833  
 
 
___________________________ 
Notes: 
The significances are based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests with (without) expected signs. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 
1% significances respectively. Y2000 (Y2001..) represents the year indicator. Industry dummies are not reported in model (B) for 
the sake of brevity. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
 
4.3  Analyses On Abnormal Audit Hours And The Provisions Of Tax And Internal Control Systems 
Design Services 
 
Knechel and Payne (2001) examine the effect of incremental audit hours (a proxy for the unobserved 
incremental audit effort), instead of the effect of incremental audit fees on ARL, using a sample of 226 firms from 
an international accounting firm. They find incremental audit hours increase ARL. They also find that, while the 
provision of management advisory service (MAS) is negatively associated with ARL, the provision of tax services is 
positively associated with ARL. They suggest that “knowledge spillover” from MAS causes this negative 
association, while complex tax situations result in additional audit efforts that increase ARL. However, we argue 
that, similar to the provision of other non-audit services, auditors may also be able to utilize “knowledge spillovers” 
by providing tax services and services relating to the design of internal control systems. Thus, we examine the 
effects of incremental audit hours, tax services and services relating to the design of internal control systems on 
ARL in the Korean context. Similar to Knechel and Payne (2001) and Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997), 
incremental audit hours are computed as the residuals from the following model: 
 
LNAHR it = 0 + β1 LNNAF it + β2 LNSIZE it + β3 TENURE it + β4 AUOP it + β5 GC it  
+ β6 ROA it + β7 LOSS it + β8 LEVERAGE it + β9 INVREC it + β10 YEND it  
+ β11 SQSUB it + β12 KSE it + β13 BIG4 it + litkk YEARDUM  
+ litjj INDDUM + lill FIRMDUM +  it  --- (3) 
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where  
 
LNAHR = natural log of audit hours; and 
all other variables are as defined in models (1) and (2). 
 
We then run the following Poisson regression model to examine the effects of incremental audit hours, non-
audit services other than tax and the design of internal control systems, tax services, services relating to the design of 
internal control systems, and other auditor-related factors. The sample size is smaller (6,576 firm-years) than that 
used for model (2) because the disclosure of audit hours was optional until 2003. In addition, some of the sample 
firms disclosed the number of days or the period spent on the audit rather than audit hours. 
 
ARL it = 0 + β1 ABAHR it + β2-1 LNNAF(NoTaxICS) it + β2-2 LNTAXF it + β2-3 LNICSF it  
+ 3 TENURE it + β4 BIG4 it + β5 AUOP it + β6 LNSIZE it + β7 ROA it + β8 LEVERAGE it  
+ β9 LOSS it + β10 YEND it + β11 SQSUB it + β12 KSE it + β13 INVREC it + β14 EXTRA it  
+ β15 OWNCON it + litkk YEARDUM + litjj INDDUM +  it  --- (4) 
 
where  
 
ABAHR: abnormal audit hours, residuals from model (3); 
LNNAF(NoTaxICS): natural log of non-audit fees excluding fees paid for tax services and services relating to the 
design of internal control systems; 
LNTAXF: natural log of tax service fees paid to auditors; 
LNICSF: natural log of fees paid to auditors for services relating to the design of internal control systems; and all 
other variables are as defined in models (1) and (2). 
 
Unlike ABAUF in model (3), abnormal audit hours (ABAHR) are negative and significant at the one percent 
level, suggesting that auditors could finish audits earlier by allocating more time than expected. This negative 
coefficient for ABAHR contradicts the finding in Knechel and Payne (2001), that an incremental audit effort 
increases ARL. Knechel and Payne (2001) also report a positive association between the provision of tax services 
and ARL, arguing that additional effort is needed because of the complex tax services auditors provide. However, 
we find evidence for a contrary position, that the provision of tax services (LNTAXF) is negatively associated with 
ARL, suggesting that auditors experience “knowledge spillovers” by providing tax services. The provision of 
services relating to the design of internal control systems (LNICSF) also provides evidence of “knowledge 
spillovers,” these even being stronger than those coming from providing tax services. Using indicator variables 
instead of the natural log of fees for tax and internal control systems design services provides qualitatively the same 
results. LNNAF(NoTaxICS) is negative and significant at the one percent level, consistent with the finding in 
Knechel and Payne (2001). All other auditor-related variables and control variables are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 3. 
 
4.4  Robustness Analyses 
 
We acknowledge the possibility that ARLs are shorter for clients that pay higher non-audit fees because 
audit firms are more interested in keeping these clients happy. Thus, we examine the models after including an 
additional control variable for audit quality. The absolute value of discretionary accruals (DACCR), measured based 
on the Cross Sectional Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995), is used as a proxy for audit quality (Krishnan 
1994; Francis et al. 1999; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). The results with this additional variable are 
qualitatively the same as those reported in this paper, while the sample size reduces to 7,511 and DACCR itself is 
insignificant (e.g., coefficient = 0.2492, p-value = 0.4032 with year/industry dummies) in any of the models (not 
reported).  
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Table 4 
Poisson Analyses on Abnormal Audit Hours/Tax/System Design Services 
 
ARL it = 0 + β1 ABAHR it + β2-1 LNNAF(NoTaxICS) it + β2-2 LNTAXF it + β2-3 LNICSF it  
+ 3 TENURE it + β4 BIG4 it + β5 AUOP it + β6 LNSIZE it + β7 ROA it + β8 LEVERAGE it  
+ β9 LOSS it + β10 YEND it + β11 SQSUB it + β12 KSE it + β13 INVREC it + β14 EXTRA it  
+ β15 OWNCON it + litkk YEARDUM + litjj INDDUM +  it  --- (4) 
(C) (C-1) (D) (D-1)
Expected
Sign
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Estimated
Coefficients
Variables (t-value) (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
Intercept +/- 4.5993 4.5884 4.7679 4.7575
    (107.137)***     (106.43)***     (91.88)***     (91.41)***
ABAHR +/- -0.0192 -0.0187 -0.0196 -0.0191
      (-5.89)***       (-5.72)***     (-6.01)***       (-5.86)***
LNNAF - -0.0035 -0.0033
    (-7.31)***     (-6.91)***
LNNAF(NoTaxICS) - -0.0027 -0.0025
         (-4.32)***          (-3.91)***
LNTAXF - -0.0020 -0.0002
         (-3.28)***          (-3.62)***
LNICSF - -0.0087 -0.0008
      (-6.38)***       (-5.97)***
TENURE - -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
         (-0.52)          (-0.20)          (0.06)          (0.37)
BIG4 - -0.0925 -0.0913 -0.0880 -0.0870
    (-23.75)***     (-23.38)***     (-22.29)***     (-21.96)***
AUOP - -0.1360 -0.1361 -0.1298 -0.1298
    (-10.59)***     (-10.59)***     (-10.07)***     (-10.06)***
LNSIZE - -0.0328 -0.0324 -0.0353 -0.0349
    (-15.35)***     (-15.10)***     (-15.45)***     (-15.26)***
ROA - -0.2133 -0.2133 -0.2222 -0.2219
    (-14.41)***     (-14.40)***     (-14.86)***     (-14.84)***
LEVERAGE + 0.0140 0.0139 0.0119 0.0119
    (13.31)***     (13.24)***     (11.09)***     (11.04)***
LOSS + 0.0434 0.0432 0.0455 0.0452
    (7.41)***     (7.36)***     (7.68)***     (7.63)***
YEND +/- 0.0159 0.0168 0.0158 0.0166
    (1.95)**     (2.05)**     (1.90)**          (1.99)
SQSUB + 0.0313 0.0318 0.0336 0.0340
    (15.82)***     (15.98)***     (16.54)***     (16.66)***
KSE - -0.0536 -0.0054 -0.0607 -0.0608
    (-10.89)***     (-10.95)***     (-11.68)***     (-11.71)***
INVREC + 0.1096 0.1107 0.1003 0.1012
    (9.03)***     (9.12)***     (7.83)***     (7.90)***
EXTRA + 0.0278 0.0280 0.0226 0.0227
      (4.49)***       (4.51)***      (3.62)**      (3.64)**  
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
OWNCON +/- 0.0003 0.0026 0.0021 0.0002
    (6.14)***     (6.16)***      (4.79)**      (4.80)**
Y2000 +/- -0.0210 -0.0210 -0.0179 -0.0180
         (-1.06)          (-1.06)          (-0.90)          (-0.90)
Y2001 +/- -0.0526 -0.0525 -0.0486 -0.0486
    (-2.80)**     (-2.79)***     (-2.58)***     (-2.58)***
Y2002 +/- -0.0766 -0.0768 -0.0713 -0.0715
         (-4.17)***          (-4.17)***          (-3.87)***          (-3.88)***
Y2003 +/- -0.0761 -0.0762 -0.0706 -0.0708
         (-4.14)***          (-4.15)***          (-3.84)***          (-3.85)***
Y2004 +/- -0.1212 -0.1213 -0.1154 -0.1154
    (-6.59)***     (-6.59)***     (-6.25)***     (-6.26)***
Y2005 +/- -0.1293 -0.1269 -0.1234 -0.1213
    (-7.02)***     (-6.88)***     (-6.68)***     (-6.56)***
Chi-Square    23,576.24***    23,557.83***    23,050.55***    23,031.70***
Psuedo-R
2
0.1489 0.1496 0.1679 0.1685
N 6,576 6,576 6,576 6,576  
 
___________________________ 
Notes: 
The significances are based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests with (without) expected signs. *, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 
1% significances respectively. Y2000 (Y2001..) represents the year indicator. ABAHR: abnormal audit hours, residuals from audit 
hour model (3); LNNAF(NoTaxICS): natural log of non-audit fees excluding fees paid for tax and internal control systems design 
services; LNTAXF: natural log of fees paid for tax services; LNICSF: natural log of fees paid for internal control systems design 
services. Industry dummies are not reported in model (D) and (D-1) for the sake of brevity. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Johnson et al. (2002) find that the short tenure indicator (3 years or less) is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals, while the long tenure indicator (more than 8 years on the audit) is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. Following Johnson et al. (2002), we include indicator variables representing short and long 
tenures instead of a continuous variable for auditor tenure. Both short and long tenure indicators, however, are not 
significant. The association between TENURE and ARL may be driven by auditor changes; we therefore run 
regressions after eliminating firms with auditor changes, but the results remain qualitatively the same. 
 
 Finally, we allow each Big 4 auditor to have a separate intercept, as each Big 4 auditors potentially uses 
different audit technology. When we use the PwC indicator as a base dummy variable, the Ernest Young indicator is 
positive and significant at the one percent level. KPMG and Deloitte Touche are also positive, but they are not 
statistically significant (not reported). The findings on the effects of each of the Big 4 on ARL are consistent with 
the findings in Panel C, Table 1. 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we examine the cross-sectional association between auditor-related characteristics and audit 
report lag. Audit report lag is one of the few variables associated with audit efficiency that is externally observable. 
Audit report lag also directly impacts the timeliness of firms‟ earnings announcements. 
 
We find that incremental audit fees, measured by the residuals from the audit fee model, are not associated 
with audit report lag; on the contrary, we find that incremental audit hours are negatively associated with ARL. This 
contrary evidence suggests that higher-than-expected audit fees do not affect audit efficiency and, instead, longer-
than-expected audit hours are used to shorten audit report lag. This may suggest that auditors in Korea are willing to 
spend additional time when they complete their audits earlier while they do not require additional fees. We 
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discussed this issue with several partners of Big 4 auditors in Korea. They indicate that this could happen in practice 
temporarily with the auditors‟ expectation of recovering the additional costs from alternative sources such as non-
audit fees and/or quasi-rent from future engagement. The examination of the recovery of audit expenses for 
additional hours is beyond the coverage of our study and would be an interesting future research topic. 
 
We further investigate associations between the provision of non-audit services, auditor tenure, affiliation 
with Big 4 auditors, and unqualified audit opinion. We find significant evidence of “knowledge spillovers” from the 
provision of non-audit services, shortening audit report lag. Further investigation on details of non-audit services 
reveals evidence that the provisions of tax and internal control systems design services also provide “knowledge 
spillovers,” improving audit efficiency. In particular, the provision of services relating to the design of internal 
control systems reduces audit report lag more than any other management advisory services. The finding on the 
provision of tax services contradicts findings from using U.S. data. We also find that Big 4 auditors and auditors 
who have issued an unqualified opinion take much less time to complete their audits, suggesting greater audit 
efficiency in these cases. 
 
Unlike previous studies which use small samples and survey data, we analyze the ARLs of a large sample 
of all publicly-traded firms in Korea over the period from 1999 to 2005, thereby increasing the ability to generalize 
the results of our findings. Our study adds to the body of literature on the timeliness of earnings announcements by 
providing new evidence on the determinants of audit report lag. Due to the data constraints, we are not able to 
examine the separate effects of abnormal audit fees by partner, manager and staff. In a future study, such a 
separation may provide more useful information to improve audit efficiency. Future research may also investigate 
the effect of corporate governance on audit report lag. 
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